THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL LIBRARY
No. 4
BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE
BY
SIGM. FREUD, M.D., LL.D.
AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION
FROM THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION
BY C.J.M. HUBBACK
THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL PRESS
LONDON
MCMXXII VIENNA
BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE
I
In the psycho-analytical theory of the mind we take it for
granted that the course of mental processes is automatically
regulated by the
̳
pleasure
-principle
‘
: that is to say, we believe
that any given process originates in an unpleasant state of
tension and thereupon determines for itself such a path that
its ultimate issue coincides with a relaxation of this tension,
i.e. with avoidance of
̳pain‘
or with production of pleasure.
When we consider the psychic processes under observation
in reference to such a sequence we are introducing into our
work the
economic
point of view. In our opinion a
presentation which seeks to estimate, not only the
topographical
and
dynamic,
but also the economic element
is the most complete that we can at present imagine, and
deserves to be distinguished by the term
meta-psychological.
We are not interested in examining how far in our assertion
of the pleasure-principle we have approached to or adopted
any given philosophical system historically established. Our
approach to such
speculative hypotheses is by way of our
endeavour
to describe and account for the facts falling within
our daily sphere of observation. Priority and originality are
not among the aims which psycho-analysis sets itself, and the
impressions on which the statement of this principle is
founded are of so unmistakable a kind that it is scarcely
possible to overlook them. On the other hand, we should
willingly acknowledge our indebtedness to any philosophical
or psychological theory that could tell us the meaning of
these feelings of pleasure and
̳pain‘
which affect us so
powerfully. Unfortunately no theory of any value is
forthcoming. It is the obscurest and least penetrable region
of psychic life and, while it is impossible for us to avoid
touching on it, the most elastic hypothesis will be, to my
mind, the best. We have decided to consider pleasure and
̳pain‘
in relation to the quantity of excitation present in the
psychic life
—
and not confined in any way
—
along such lines
that
̳pain‘
corresponds with an increase and pleasure with a
decrease in this quantity. We do not thereby commit
ourselves to a simple relationship between the strength of
the feelings and the changes corresponding with them, least
of all, judging from psycho-physiological experiences, to any
view of a direct proportion existing between them; probably
the amount of diminution or increase in a given time is
the decisive factor for feeling. Possibly there is room here
for experimental work, but it is inadvisable for us analysts to
go further into these problems until we can be guided by
q
uite definite observations
.
We ca
nnot however profess the like indifference when we
find that an investigator of such penetratio
n as G.Th.
Fechner has advocated a conception of pleasure and
̳pain‘
w
hich in essentials coincides with that forced upon us by
psycho-analytic work. Fechner
‘s
pronouncement is to be
found in his short work
̳
Einige Ideen zur Schöpfungs- und
E
ntwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen
‘
, 1873 (Section XI,
Note p. 94) and reads as follows:
̳
In so far as conscious
impulses always bear a relation to pleasure or
―
pain
‖
,
pleasure or
―
pain
‖
may be thought of in psycho-physical
relationship to conditions of stability and instability, and
upon this may be based the hypothesis I intend to develop
elsewhere, viz.: that every psycho-physical movement rising
above the threshold of consciousness is charged with
pleasure in proportion as it approximates
—
beyond a certain
limit
—
to complete equilibrium, and with
―
pain
‖
in
proportion as it departs from it beyond a certain limit; while
between the two limits which may be described as the
qualitative thresholds of
―
pain
‖
or pleasure, there is a certain
area of aesthetic indifference.
‘
The facts that have led us to believe in the supremacy of the
pleasure-principle in psychic life also find expression in the
hypothesis that there is an attempt on the part of the psychic
apparatus to keep the quantity of excitation present as low as
possible, or at least constant. This is the same supposition
only put into another form, for, if the psychic apparatus
operates in the direction of keeping down the quantity of
excitation, all that tends to increase it must be felt to be
contrary to function, that is to say painful. The pleasure-
principle is deduced from the principle of constancy; in
rea
lity the principle of constancy was inferred from the facts
th
at necessitated our assumption of the pleasure-principle.
On more detailed discussion we shall find further that this
tendency on the part of the psychic apparatus postulated b
y
us may be classified as a special case of Fechner
‘s
principle
of the
tendency towards stability
to which he has related the
pleasure-pain feeling
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